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1 
REVOLUTIONS IN LOCAL DEMOCRACY? 
NEIGHBORHOOD COUNCILS AND BROADENING 
INCLUSION IN THE LOCAL POLITICAL PROCESS 
Matthew J. Parlow* 
Political marginalization of minorities and government corruption are two key factors 
that have led to the overwhelming decline and decay of America’s major cities. Local 
governments must combat the historical entrenchment of these two evils in order to 
reverse the trend toward demise. Neighborhood councils may be the best structural 
changes to local government because they provide more meaningful opportunities for 
political engagement of minority groups, while also serving as an antidote to 
systemic corruption in local government. This Essay analyzes the problems plaguing 
local government in urban cities and explores how neighborhood councils may be 
able to help address them. 
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INTRODUCTION 
It is no secret that many of America’s major cities are broken and 
face overwhelming, perhaps even insurmountable, challenges. The root 
causes of the problems afflicting these cities are too numerous and com-
plex to give appropriate analysis to in any single article. However, two 
themes running through local government scholarship provide a  
 
 
 * Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and Associate Professor of Law, Marquette 
University Law School. J.D., Yale Law School; B.A., Loyola Marymount University. I am 
grateful to Professor Janie Kim for her thoughts on this Essay; to Katie Mayer, Brooke 
Mallette, and Ashley Wilson for their research assistance; to Ashley Washington and the 
editors of the Michigan Journal of Race & Law for inviting me to participate in their sympo-
sium entitled “Reinventing the Wheel: Why Broken Cities Stay Broken and New Ways 
Civil Rights Attorneys Can Fix Them,” as well as for their editing and research assistance; 
and to the Marquette University Law School for its financial support. 
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foundation upon which to understand some of the problems and attempt 
to craft solutions to them: the marginalization of minorities in municipal 
decision-making and corruption in city government.  
One answer to these problems may be a change in the structure of 
local governments. As I have explored elsewhere, neighborhood coun-
cils—new substructures of local government that aim to involve citizens 
in the decision- and policy-making processes—can improve civic en-
gagement.1 But can they provide more meaningful opportunities for  
minority groups to engage in municipal politics and to influence  
policy-making on the local level? Moreover, can these new entities help 
correct and prevent systemic problems of corruption in local govern-
ment? This Essay will explore whether neighborhood councils can serve 
as one of many necessary solutions to these and other critical challenges 
plaguing many of America’s cities. The focus of the Michigan Journal of 
Race & Law’s 2010 symposium, the city of Detroit, also offers a compel-
ling case study that illustrates the need for this type of creative solution.  
Part I of this Essay will explore the problems of the marginalization 
of minorities in local government decision-making as well as corruption 
in municipal governance. Part II will discuss why local governments pro-
vide the best forum for increasing minority civic participation and 
addressing corruption within local government. Part III will detail the rise 
of neighborhood councils and their role in local governments. Part IV 
will explore some of the challenges facing this expansion of local govern-
ing coalitions. Finally, the Essay concludes by offering optimism and some 
suggestions for ensuring the possibility of neighborhood councils increas-
ing minority voices and involvement in local decision-making, as well as 
reversing or preventing the incidence of corruption in local government. 
I. Minority Marginalization and Corruption in  
Local Government  
A. Minority Marginalization 
It would be an understatement to say that all levels of government—
federal, state, and local—have disenfranchised and marginalized minority 
populations.2 Through legal and institutional mechanisms, our various 
levels of government have excluded minority groups from decision- and 
policy-making processes. This exclusion has certainly been true on the 
 
 
 1. Matthew J. Parlow, Civic Republicanism, Public Choice Theory, and Neighborhood 
Councils: A New Model for Civic Engagement, 79 U. Colo. L. Rev. 137 (2008).  
 2. See, e.g., Sheryll D. Cashin, Federalism, Welfare Reform, and the Minority Poor: 
Accounting for the Tyranny of State Majorities, 99 Colum. L. Rev. 552 (1999) (detailing how 
majorities on the state level disenfranchise low-income welfare recipients).  
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local level.3 For instance, the typically smaller number of total members 
on local legislative bodies (that is, city councils) “makes more likely the 
formation of permanent and possibly corrupt majorities, effectively disen-
franchising minorities.”4 In addition, in the current “winner-takes-all” 
approach to our voting system, even the well-intentioned creation of sin-
gle-member districts that ensure the election of some minority 
representatives leads to these minority elected officials being ignored, 
overwhelmed, or outvoted by the White legislative majority.5 Moreover, 
despite significant civil rights reforms, many local government regulations 
and policies (in particular, those related to zoning and land use) exacer-
bate physical racial segregation that also disempowers minority 
communities.6 Minority marginalization also occurs in local educational 
settings. For example, in many school districts, White upper middle-class 
parents often wield a disproportionate amount of power and influence 
over local education policy, which hinders reform opportunities targeted 
at low-income minority students.7  
To be sure, minorities have made advances in their representation 
and influence in local government, particularly in the last decade or so. 
For example, in the city of Los Angeles, minorities make up more than 
fifty percent of the City Council.8 Indeed, much social science literature 
suggests that minorities have made their most significant political strides 
in local government.9 There are many possible explanations for these  
 
 
 3. See Sheryll D. Cashin, Localism, Self-Interest, and the Tyranny of the Favored Quar-
ter: Addressing the Barriers to New Regionalism, 88 Geo. L.J. 1985, 1998–2002 (2000) 
(noting how regional fragmentation of local governments has led to the disenfranchise-
ment of poor and minority populations in many metropolitan areas).  
 4. Robert Eisig Bienstock, Municipal Antitrust Liability: Beyond Immunity, 73 Cal. 
L. Rev. 1829, 1846–47 (1985).  
 5. See Reenah L. Kim, Note, Legitimizing Community Consent to Local Policing: The 
Need for Democratically Negotiated Representation on Civilian Advisory Councils, 36 Harv. 
C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 461, 516 (2001).  
 6. See Richard Thompson Ford, The Boundaries of Race: Political Geography in Legal 
Analysis, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 1841, 1860–64 (1994).  
 7. See Kevin G. Welner, Legal Rights, Local Wrongs: When Community 
Control Collides with Educational Equity 230–32 (2001).  
 8. See City Council: The City of Los Angeles, http://lacity.org/ 
YourGovernment/CityCouncil/index.htm (last visited Sept. 21, 2010) (listing eight mi-
nority city councilmembers out of fifteen in the City Council directory: Councilmembers 
Ed Reyes (1st District), Tony Cardenas (6th District), Richard Alarcon (7th District), 
Bernard Parks (8th District), Jan Perry (9th District), Herb J. Wesson, Jr. (10th District), 
Eric Garcetti (13th District), and Jose Huizar (14th District)). Before the 2009 elections, 
two of Los Angeles’s citywide elected officials were Latino: Mayor Antonio Villaraigosa 
and City Attorney Rocky Delgadillo. See Henry Weinstein, L.A.’s New Mayor, L.A. 
Times, May 19, 2005, at A21.  
 9. See Jeffrey M. Berry et al., Democracy at Risk: How Political Choices 
Undermine Citizen Participation 85, n.99 (citing David A. Bositis, Black Elected 
Officials: A Statistical Summary 2001 (2003) (noting, among other relevant statistics, 
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successes: better community organizing,10 White flight to the suburbs,11 
and the like. Nevertheless, despite the increase in the number of minori-
ties in politics, plenty of evidence indicates that minority groups continue 
to be excluded and marginalized in local governance. Simply put, the dis-
enfranchisement of minority communities in local governance persists as 
a civil rights issue in need of legal reform—namely, innovative change in 
local government structuring. 
Detroit provides a good context for an analysis of these issues. 
Throughout its history, but particularly during the 1950s and 1960s, De-
troit, like most major American cities, was marked by racial tension and 
segregation.12 Such circumstances came about due to a severe economic 
decline in Detroit’s inner city and the pattern of residential housing dis-
crimination that marked the post-World War II era in most major cities.13 
In addition to the physical segregation in the city, the labor market also 
demonstrated distinct racial segregation: African Americans made up the 
majority of the workforce, while White workers filled the majority of 
management positions.14 Under this system, African Americans enjoyed 
little representation or influence in local politics and decision-making.15 
The growing racial tensions culminated in the Detroit riots of 1967.16 
 
that in 1990, 72.3% of African American elected office holders served on the local level)); 
David A. Bositis, Black Elected Officials: A Statistical Summary 2001 
(2003)(noting that since 1970, the number of Black mayors increased in cities with more 
than 50,000 residents where African Americans did not constitute a majority of the popu-
lation); Nat’l Ass’n of Latino Elected Officials, A Profile of Latino Elected Officials in the 
United States and Their Progress Since 1996, available at http://www.naleo.org/downloads/ 
NALEOFactSheet07.pdf (noting sixty-eight percent of the Latino elected officials in 2007 
served in municipal governments or on school boards).  
 10. See, e.g., Carla Dorsey, Note, It Takes a Village: Why Community Organizing is 
More Effective than Litigation Alone at Ending Discriminatory Housing Code Enforcement, 12 
Geo. J. on Poverty L. & Pol’y 437, 454–64 (2005) (detailing community organizing 
efforts to stop discriminatory housing code enforcement).  
 11. See, e.g., Jennifer C. Johnson, Race-Based Housing Importunities: The Disparate 
Impact of Realistic Group Conflict, 8 Loy. J. Pub. Int. L. 97, 120 n.137 (2007) (explaining 
that the result of White flight to the suburbs has been city populations with higher per-
centages of racial minorities); see also Michael A. Stegman, National Urban Policy Revisited, 
71 N.C. L. Rev. 1737, 1738 (1993) (noting that White flight to the suburbs, coupled 
with significant immigration, has resulted in racial minorities constituting demographic 
majorities in some of America’s largest cities, including Detroit).  
 12. See Tom I. Romero, II, Kelo, Parents and the Spatialization of Color (Blindness) in 
the Berman-Brown Metropolitan Heterotopia, 2008 Utah L. Rev. 947, 979 n.165 (2008).  
 13. See generally Thomas J. Sugrue, The Origins of the Urban Crisis: Race and 
Inequality in Postwar Detroit 3 (1996).  
 14. See id. at 104 and 169.  
 15. See Daniel Okrent, Detroit: The Death—and Possible Life—of a Great City, Time, 
Sept. 24, 2009, available at http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599, 
1925796,00.html.  
 16. See Edward L. Glaeser & Andrei Shleifer, The Curley Effect: The Economics of 
Shaping the Electorate, 21 J.L. Econ. & Org. 1, 12 (2005).  
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This civil unrest helped spur the outmigration of Whites to the suburbs.17 
By the end of the 1960s, Detroit had become an African American ma-
jority city.18 From 1970 to 1990, the African American population as a 
percentage of Detroit’s population grew from 43.7% to 75.7%.19 As one 
commentator remarked, “the racial demography that ensued is . . . a living 
relic of that chapter of Detroit’s recent history.”20 
In 1973, this change in Detroit’s racial demographics helped lead to 
the election of the city’s first African American mayor, Coleman Young.21 
Many African Americans appreciated this breakthrough in elected repre-
sentation, and hoped that Young’s election would provide better 
opportunities for their involvement in the local decision-making pro-
cess—one from which they had been alienated and excluded for so long. 
Unfortunately, the opposite occurred. Mayor Young’s tenure was marked 
by a lack of accountability to many African American residents, who re-
mained, in many respects, disconnected from local government.22 What 
could have been a shift toward ensuring that the voices of the African 
American community were heard more effectively in city government 
turned out to be an opportunity lost. In addition, the lack of community 
involvement was highlighted by a series of ensuing corruption scandals.23 
This lack of accountability and separation between community 
stakeholders and their city government transcended Mayor Young’s twen-
ty years in office and continued during subsequent mayoral 
administrations.24 These frequent failures in accountability and communi-
cation inculcated apathy and a sense of alienation among all city residents 
(including the African American community), which led to their civic 
disengagement. Such problems were not and are not unique to Detroit. In 
 
 
 17. See Brian Gromley, Appraising Detroit: A Follow-up to HUD’s “Barriers to the 
Rehabilitation of Affordable Housing Study, 12 J. Affordable Hous. & Cmty. Dev. L. 314, 
316 n.9 (2003).  
 18. See Okrent, supra note 15, at 3.  
 19. See Glaeser & Shleifer, supra note 16, at 12.  
 20. Khaled Ali Beydoun, Without Color of Law: The Losing Race Against Colorblind-
ness in Michigan, 12 Mich. J. Race & L. 465, 480 (2007).  
 21. See William A. Fischel, The Political Economy of Public Use in Poletown: How 
Federal Grants Encourage Excessive Use of Eminent Domain, 2004 Mich. St. L. Rev. 929, 
940 (2004). The election was based almost strictly on racial lines: every White precinct 
voted for John Nichols, the White police commissioner, who garnered more than 90% of 
the White vote. See Glaeser & Shleifer, supra note 16, at 12. Young, on the other hand, 
garnered the support of every African American precinct and more than 90% of the Afri-
can American voters. See id.  
 22. See Todd Shaw, Now is the Time!: Detroit Black Politics and Grass-
roots Activism 73 (2009).  
 23. See, e.g., Snarled in Corruption Traffic, Time, Feb. 21, 1982, at 1, available at 
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,925880,00.html.  
 24. See Ken Fireman, Political Heavyweights Slug It Out in Detroit, Newsday, July 27, 
1989, at 4.  
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fact, the lack of opportunities for civic engagement is a problem that per-
vades many communities and one that residents across racial and socio-
economic lines lament.25 In this regard, for Detroit and for other similarly 
situated cities, the legal inclusion of neighborhood councils into local 
government structures may provide a new opportunity for increased civic 
participation for minority groups—providing them with the ability to 
become more ensconced and influential in local government decision-
making.  
B. Corruption 
Corruption is another problem that plagues many municipalities to-
day, but this is not a new issue for cities, which have an infamous history 
with corruption. During the 19th century and into the beginning of the 
20th century, city governments were run by corrupt boss-led political 
party machines.26 These political machines used city governments to their 
advantage in large part by using political patronage to keep constituents, 
other elected officials, and even the judiciary within their control.27 In 
response, in the early 20th century, the reforms of the Progressive Era 
(namely non-partisan local elections and the initiative and referenda pro-
cesses), sought to extricate political machines and their attendant 
corruption from local governance.28 At the time, this cleansing of local 
government succeeded for the most part.  
However, corruption once again found its way into local govern-
ance and continues, in varying degrees, today. For example, traditional 
corruption crimes such as bribery and illegal gratuities persist.29 In re-
 
 
 25. Michele Frisby & Monica Bowman, What We Have Here is a Failure to Com-
municate, Pub. Mgmt. A-1 (Feb. 1996).  
 26. See David J. Barron, Reclaiming Home Rule, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 2255, 2289–
2307 (2003).  
 27. See Herbert M. Kritzer, Law is the Mere Continuation of Politics By Different 
Means: American Judicial Selection in the Twenty-First Century, 56 DePaul L. Rev. 423, 429 
(2007) (noting that local political machines controlled members of the judiciary through 
patronage); Richard L. Hasen, Entrenching the Duopoly: Why the Supreme Court Should Not 
Allow the States to Protect the Democrats and Republicans From Political Competition, 1997 Sup. 
Ct. Rev. 331, 358 (finding that political machines used jobs and government benefits to 
maintain voter support).  
 28. See David Schleicher, Why Is There No Competition in City Council Elections?: 
The Role of Election Law, 23 J.L. & Pol. 419, 421 (2007) (explaining the rise of local non-
partisan elections); Nicholas M. Kublicki, Land Use By, For, and Of the People: Problems 
With the Application of Initiatives and Referenda to the Zoning Process, 19 Pepp. L. Rev. 99, 
114 n.122 (1991) (discussing the initiative and referenda processes as a key component of 
the Progressive Era reforms to political machine corruption).  
 29. See Colleen B. Dixon et al., Public Corruption, 46 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 927, 929–
49 (2009).  
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sponse, federal, state, and local governments have passed stricter laws pro-
hibiting such behavior.30 However, enforcing such laws has proven more 
difficult than the public might like.31 Corruption in the awarding of city 
government contracts also continues to plague many municipalities. Scan-
dals involving government contracts have led many cities to reform their 
government contracting procedures to avoid corruption or even the ap-
pearance of impropriety.32  
One of the well-known problems in local government is police cor-
ruption. As one scholar notes, there has been a long and unflattering 
history of police corruption and of local elected officials (at worst) sup-
porting or (at best) acquiescing to such corruption.33 Finally, other 
scholars have lamented the seemingly entrenched corruption in the area 
of local governments’ greatest power and authority: land use.34 Local 
elected officials are able to perpetrate such corruption with impunity be-
cause of their control over the cumbersome, fragmented, and onerous 
land-use approval process.35 The lack of civic engagement, as detailed 
above, further frustrates the public’s ability to hold elected officials ac-
countable in the land use context.  
Detroit provides an interesting example of how corruption plagued, 
and continues to plague, city government, as illustrated by one high pro-
file scandal that occurred during Mayor Young’s tenure. During the 1980s, 
there was a federal investigation into alleged bribery involving Vista Dis-
posal, Inc.’s attempt to secure a $5.6 million sludge-hauling contract from 
the city of Detroit.36 A federal grand jury indicted businesswoman Dar-
ralyn Bowers and her business partners at Vista Disposal on charges of 
 
 
 30. See id.  
 31. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., et al., Cases and Materials on Legislation: 
Statutes and the Creation of Public Policy 299–310 (Am. Casebook Series ed., 4th 
ed. 2007).  
 32. See, e.g., Janna J. Hansen, Note, Limits of Competition: Accountability in Govern-
ment Contracting, 112 Yale L.J. 2465, 2482–83 (2003) (detailing the City of New York’s 
government contracting procedure reform).  
 33. See Carol S. Steiker, Second Thoughts About First Principles, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 
820, 834–35 (1994).  
 34. See Alejandro E. Camacho, Mustering the Missing Voices: A Collaborative Model for 
Fostering Equality, Community Involvement and Adaptive Planning in Land Use Decisions, 24 
Stan. Envtl. L.J. 3, 42–43 (2005) (noting that “it is not uncommon for developers to 
pay off elected officials in exchange for favorable decisions”). See also Denis Binder, The 
Potential Application of RICO in the Natural Resources/Environmental Law Context, 63 Denv. 
U. L. Rev. 535, 560 (1986) (explaining that “fraud, kickbacks, and corruption are very 
common in land development”); David A. Dana, Land Use Regulation in an Age of Height-
ened Scrutiny, 75 N.C. L. Rev. 1243, 1272–74 (1997) (providing examples of developers’ 
unseemly influence over land use decisions, including through bribery).  
 35. See Susan Rose-Ackerman, Corruption: A Study in Political Economy 
170 (1978).  
 36. Snarled in Corruption Traffic, supra note 23.  
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conspiracy and violating both the Hobbs Act and the Racketeer Influ-
enced and Corrupt Organizations Act.37 Bowers was an unofficial advisor 
to Mayor Young.38 The indicted defendants allegedly bribed the city’s Di-
rector of Water and Sewerage, Charles Beckham, with $2,000 a month to 
secure the sludge-hauling contract.39 Although the Federal Bureau of  
Investigation (FBI) never obtained enough evidence to accuse Mayor 
Young of “anything more than being an unindicted co-conspirator”,40 the 
corruption scandal tainted how citizens viewed his administration, even 
leading to a recall campaign against him.  
Many recent corruption scandals have plagued Detroit during one 
of the most difficult economic times it has ever faced. For example, in 
2003, Karl Kado, a government contractor, was accused of paying kick-
backs to former Cobo Center board members to secure or maintain food, 
electrical, and janitorial service contracts for the facility.41 Kado pleaded 
guilty to filing false tax returns, and his plea agreement suggests that not 
only did Kado offer the bribes, but that city officials requested other pay-
ments as well.42 The scandal eventually concluded when two board 
members pled guilty to felonies for bribery.43 
Another sludge-hauling contract scandal erupted about four years 
after the Cobo Center debacle. At stake was a $1.2 billion sludge-hauling 
contract,44 which the city of Detroit awarded to Synagro Technologies, 
Inc., on a narrow five to four vote.45 Almost immediately allegations of 
bribery surfaced because City Councilmember Monica Conyers had 
changed her position from opposing to supporting Synagro’s contract bid 
just before the vote on the contract, thus casting the deciding vote in 
 
 
 37. See Cnty. of Oakland v. Vista Disposal, Inc., 826 F. Supp. 218, 221 (E.D. Mich. 
1993).  
 38. Snarled in Corruption Traffic, supra note 23.  
 39. Id.  
 40. David Ashenfelter et al., Kilpatrick’s Father is Target of FBI Probe, Detroit Free 
Press, Aug. 16, 2008, http://www.freep.com/article/20080816/NEWS01/808160374/ 
Kilpatrick%5C-s-father-is-target-of-FBI-probe (last visited Nov. 13, 2010).  
 41. Mary Kramer, The Mayor Isn’t Our Only Problem, Crain’s Detroit Business, 
Aug. 11, 2008, http://www.crainsdetroit.com/article/20080811/SUB/817161995/1056 
(last visited Oct. 28, 2010).  
 42. Paul Egan, Scandal at Cobo Deepens, The Detroit News, June 9, 2009, at A3, 
available at http://detnews.com/article/20090609/METRO/906090347/Scandal-at-
Cobo-deepens.  
 43. See Darren A. Nichols, Council Weighs Ban on ‘Pay to Play’, The Detroit 
News, June 23, 2009, at A1.  
 44. Doug Guthrie, ‘Not the End’ of City Hall Corruption Investigation, The Detroit 
News, June 27, 2009, at A8.  
 45. See David Ashenfelter et al., Synagro Exec’s Vehicle Wired: Alleged Bribes Cut, 
Payoffs Recounted as Camera Filmed High Quality Images, Detroit Free Press, Jan. 25, 
2009, at A1.  
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Synagro’s favor.46 Once investigators started looking into allegations that 
Conyers took a bribe in exchange for her vote, other improprieties sur-
faced. Conyers and her longtime consultant and chief of staff, Sam Riddle, 
allegedly took bribes and extorted money from business owners in De-
troit for a variety of political favors.47 In fact, during the investigation, an 
FBI informant was paid $10,000 to arrange bribes for Conyers and Rid-
dle for favorable action on a real estate project.48 The informant paid the 
money to businessman Rayford Jackson, who commented that such pay-
ments were “a regular part of his business” and that “[Conyers] sends 
[Riddle] out there to shake me, this happens all the time.”49 Consequently, 
Riddle was indicted for extortion and bribery, while Conyers waived in-
dictment and opted to plead guilty.50 She pled guilty to the bribery 
charges, including accepting $6,000 to change her vote on the Synagro 
contract.51 In her plea agreement, Conyers also acknowledged committing 
other illegal conduct, such as accepting money for her favorable action as 
a councilmember.52 This deep-rooted, pay-to-play, illegal behavior further 
sullied the city government’s reputation. 
Detroit endured many other scandals, including ones related to 
elected city officials illegally misusing city funds,53 police corruption,54 and 
 
 
 46. See Paul Egan, Conyers Worries About FBI Investigation, The Detroit News, 
June 20, 2009, at A1.  
 47. See Nolan Finley, How Detroit’s Corruption Works, The Detroit News, June 28, 
2009, at A29. Conyers was accused, among other things, of taking $40,000 worth of jew-
elry from a storeowner seeking to have restrictions eased on his business. See Conyers 
Recorded Praising Shop Owner, The Detroit News, June 24, 2009, at A3. Riddle was also 
accused of demanding $25,000 from a business owner seeking to open a strip club. See 
Paul Egan and Leonard N. Fleming, Riddle May Face Extortion Charges, The Detroit 
News, July 15, 2009 at A1.  
 48. See David Ashenfelter et al., Informant Paid to Set Up Bribes, Prosecutors Say, De-
troit Free Press, Jan. 29, 2010, at A5.  
 49. Ben Schmitt et al., Prosecutors’ Memo: FBI Gave Money to Set Up Riddle Bribe: 
Recordings Revealed in Trial Filing, Detroit Free Press, Jan. 29, 2010.  
 50. See Waiver of Indictment, United States v. Conyers, Crim. No. 09-20025 (E.D. 
Mich. filed June 26, 2009); David Ashenfelter et al., Feds: Conyers, Riddle Teamed Up to 
Extort at Least $65,000: Ex-State Legislator Mary Walters Also Indicted, Detroit Free Press, 
July 15, 2009.  
 51. See Paul Egan, Conyers Admits Trading Synagro Vote for Cash, The Detroit 
News, June 27, 2009, at A1.  
 52. See id. See also The Case for Conspiracy, Detroit Free Press, Feb. 21, 2010, at 
A6 (noting that Conyers pled guilty to taking $6,000 in exchange for her vote in favor of 
a certain city contract).  
 53. See United States v. Bates, No. 05-81027, 2009 WL 3270190 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 
9, 2009) (involving former Detroit City Councilman Alonzo Bates using his yearly office 
budget to pay family members who did not actually work for him).  
 54. See Roger Roots, Are Cops Constitutional?, 11 Seton Hall Const. L.J. 685, 
719 (2001) (noting that many Detroit Police Department officers have been involved in 
such crimes as drug trafficking, hiring hit men, and looting informant funds).  
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other embarrassing government actions. This culture of corruption has a 
corrosive effect on local government and civic engagement in Detroit and 
in other cities suffering from similar maladies. Such a culture excludes 
residents and enables those who perpetrate such illegalities. It also alien-
ates community stakeholders who understandably feel disconnected and 
disheartened by the actions of their city government. There are multiple 
approaches, collective and individual, that could reduce or eliminate the 
negative effect that corruption has on local government.55 Indeed, as dis-
cussed further below, better civic engagement and community stakeholder 
oversight can help address the problem of corruption in municipal gov-
ernment, as well as the lack of minority involvement in local  
decision-making.  
II. Local Governments: the Optimal Forum for Increasing  
Minority Participation 
Local governments, as opposed to state or federal governments, hold 
the greatest potential for increasing civic participation for minority 
groups and the community at large. Local governments are much smaller 
in size and thus afford the opportunity for community stakeholders to 
interface with decision-makers.56 State and federal governments are simply 
too large and inaccessible for meaningful public participation.57 Costs of 
participation are lower on the local level, making it easier for community 
members to get involved in local governance.58 Moreover, much critical 
regulation and a vast array of goods and services that affect our day-to-day 
lives are handled on the local level.59 Finally, local government is the level 
at which minority groups, particularly African Americans and Latinos, 
have had the most political and electoral success.60 Therefore, to correct a 
 
 
 55. See Debra S. Weisberg, Note, Eliminating Corruption in Local Government: The 
Local Government Ethics Law, 17 Seton Hall Legis. J. 303, 309 (1993) (describing how 
New Jersey’s Local Government Ethics Law seeks to root out corruption and conflicts of 
interest in municipal governance).  
 56. See Richard Briffault, “What About the ‘Ism’?” Normative and Formal Concerns in 
Contemporary Federalism, 47 Vand. L. Rev. 1303, 1315 (1994).  
 57. Parlow, supra note 1, at 144.  
 58. See Richard Briffault, Home Rule for the Twenty-first Century, 36 Urb. Law. 253, 
258 (2004).  
 59. Robert L. Lineberry, Equality and Urban Policy: The Distribution of 
Municipal Public Services 10 (1977) (“The services performed by municipalities are 
those most vital to the preservation of life (police, fire, sanitation, public health), liberty 
(police, courts, prosecutors), property (zoning, planning, taxing), and public enlighten-
ment (schools, libraries).”).  
 60. See generally Bositis, supra note 9; Nat’l Ass’n of Latino Elected Officials, supra 
note 9. See also, David A. Bositis, Black Political Power in the New Century, in The Black 
Metropolis in the Twenty-First Century: Race, Power, and Politics of Place 
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persisting civil rights injustice—the continued disenfranchisement and 
marginalization of minority communities in government decision-
making—local governments and the ability to alter their structure provide 
the most fruitful forum for crafting a legal solution to this problem. 
Yet many view local governments as having been captured by spe-
cial interest groups to advance those groups’ private interests, with willing 
elected officials seeking their support to advance the officials’ political 
careers.61 The corruption scandals detailed above support this notion. Un-
surprisingly, citizens of the locality, including minority groups, are 
alienated by this problem. In addition, they find the barriers to entry into 
local politics too high for collective action and participation.62 This is due, 
in part, to the way in which local governments are structured. Most cities 
have a very centralized governmental and decision-making structure that 
leaves little room for civic engagement and diverse voices.63 It is this type 
of environment that allows corruption to proliferate: when community 
stakeholders are not engaged in the functioning of their government, it is 
more difficult for them to hold their elected officials accountable.  
Many have argued that because of such structuring, local govern-
ments are conduits for the rich, powerful, and politically connected to 
achieve their economic, social, and political goals.64 This result, of course, 
is at the expense of others and to the exclusion of many. However, the 
legal restructuring of local governments to engage residents, including the 
traditionally disenfranchised minority communities, can help reverse dis-
turbing patterns of racial exclusion and address the problem of corruption 
in city government. 
 
221–42 (Robert D. Bullard ed., 2007); David A. Bositis, The Future of Majority-Minority 
Districts and Black and Hispanic Legislative Representation, in Redistricting and Minority 
Representation: Learning from the Past, Preparing for the Future 9–42 (David A. 
Bositis ed., 1998).  
 61. See Myron Orfield, Metropolitics: A Regional Agenda for Community 
and Stability 5–6 (1997) (describing how the “favored quarter” manipulates local gov-
ernment processes to reap the greatest benefits at the expense of the majority of the 
population in the locality); Robert C. Ellickson, New Institutions for Old Neighborhoods, 48 
Duke L.J. 75, 89 (1998) (explaining how local governments are captured by special inter-
est groups).  
 62. See Matthew A. Crenson & Benjamin Ginsberg, Downsizing Democracy: 
How America Sidelined Its Citizens and Privatized Its Public 1, 14 (2002).  
 63. See William H. Hansell, Jr., A Common Vision for the Future: The Role of Local 
Government and Citizens in the Democratic Process, 85 Nat’l Civic Rev. no. 3, Fall 1996 at 
9 (describing the “vending machine” model, where local governments view citizens as 
passive consumers, acquiescing to pay their share of taxes and fees for various services 
instead of being actively involved in the decision-making process).  
 64. See Orfield, supra note 61, at 5–6; Cashin, supra note 3, at 1987.  
PARLOW ITP3 B.DOC 11/29/2010 1:59 PM 
12 Michigan Journal of Race & Law [Vol. 16:xxx 
III. Neighborhood Councils and Their Role  
in Local Government 
Neighborhood councils65 may be able to alter this perverse legal 
structure and provide more opportunities for civic participation, particu-
larly for traditionally marginalized groups. Cities have created 
neighborhood councils through two legal mechanisms: by incorporating 
new provisions in their city charters or by passing new statutes. Voters 
generally adopt city charter amendments or new city charters through 
ballot initiatives.66 For example, the city of Los Angeles created neighbor-
hood councils when it adopted a new city charter in 1999 through a city-
wide vote.67 The city’s legislative body, usually a city council, traditionally 
adopts city statutes. The City Council of the city of Tacoma, Washington, 
for instance, adopted neighborhood councils in 1992 by statute.68  
Neighborhood councils aim to bring together a broad cross-section 
of the community to deliberate over various laws, decisions, and policies.69 
The goal of this dialogic process is to bring community members to a 
consensus as to what decisions further the common good.70 The commu-
nity then informs its local decision-makers as to its preferences and needs, 
thereby influencing the local government’s policy outputs.71 However, 
how cities structure and support neighborhood councils will determine 
how successful the councils will be, both generally and with regard to 
including those marginalized in society and preventing corruption in lo-
cal governance. This structure and support will be central in order for 
 
 
 65. While the official names for these types of local government substructures may 
vary a bit, I use the term “neighborhood council” to describe them.  
 66. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Challenging Direct Democracy, 2007 Mich. St. L. Rev. 
293, 306 (2007) (describing the flood of ballot initiatives presented to California voters in 
every election, including one in 1999 to amend the Los Angeles City Charter). See also 
Lynn A. Baker & Daniel B. Rodriguez, Constitutional Home Rule and Judicial Scrutiny, 86 
Denv. U. L. Rev. 1337, 1374–1424 (2009) (providing an appendix detailing the home 
rule provisions in the states in 2009).  
 67. See Matthew J. Parlow & James T. Keane, Richard Riordan and Los Angeles Char-
ter Reform, Center for the Study of Los Angeles White Paper Series, 48–67 (2002), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=942448.  
 68. What Are Neighborhood Councils?, Central Tacoma Neighborhood Council, 
http://www.cnc-tacoma.com/neighborhoodcouncils.html (last visited Aug. 1, 2010).  
 69. Parlow, supra note 1, at 167.  
 70. See Peter W. Salsich, Jr., Grassroots Consensus Building and Collaborative Planning, 
3 Wash. U. J.L. & Pol’y 709, 714, 717, 722 (2000) (defining consensus-building in this 
context, and describing neighborhood councils in Atlanta and Washington D.C.). See 
generally Frank Benest, Serving Customers or Engaging Citizens: What is the Future of Local 
Government?, 78 Pub. Mgmt. A6, A7 (1996) (explaining the purpose of the Brea, Califor-
nia neighborhood councils).  
 71. See Parlow, supra note 1, at 181–82.  
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cities to avoid repeating the mistakes of past attempts at civic engagement 
that had limited success in engaging the disenfranchised. 
For example, cities often allow community stakeholders to define 
the boundaries of their neighborhood councils to reflect natural neigh-
borhoods and communities.72 This approach allows the creation of 
neighborhood councils to be more organic and stem from community 
initiatives. Once communities have drawn their boundaries, they can ap-
ply for certification from the city to be a recognized neighborhood 
council.73 Neighborhood council areas range in size from covering a few 
thousand people to more than 125,000 people.74 Ideally, the smaller the 
neighborhood council, the more likely that meaningful “face-to-face” 
interaction will occur; the larger the geographic area and population, the 
less effective the neighborhood council is likely to be.75  
Another related question is, who should participate in neighbor-
hood councils? Traditional participatory theory views individuals as being 
part of only one community: the one in which they live.76 However, more 
contemporary definitions of community transcend this strict boundary. In 
response, many cities have crafted more inclusive definitions of eligible 
community stakeholders to include residents, business owners, property 
owners, educators, church-goers, members of community organizations, 
and the like.77 For their long-term success and viability, neighborhood 
councils must be open to and include a diverse cross-section of the local 
community. Community stakeholders must be able to confront one an-
other with their different experiences and cultural backgrounds to search 
 
 
 72. See, e.g., Frederick A. O. Schwartz, Jr., & Eric Lane, The Policy and Politics of 
Charter Making: The Story of New York City’s 1989 Charter, 42 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 723, 
822–23 (1998) (detailing the criteria used by New York City to set up its neighborhood 
councils) and Juliet A. Musso et al., Univ. of S. Cal. Urban Initiative, Neighbor-
hood Councils in Los Angeles: A Midterm Status Report 4 (2004), available at 
http://www.usc.edu/schools/sppd/research/npp/FINAL_Midterm_Report.pdf (noting 
that the City of Los Angeles’s approach to neighborhood councils permits self-selection).  
 73. See, e.g., Musso et al., supra note 72, at 14.  
 74. E.g., Richard Briffault, The New York City Charter and the Question of Scale, 42 
N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 1059, 1064 (1998) (noting that New York City’s fifty-nine neigh-
borhood councils represent an average of 125,000 residents) and Musso et al., supra note 
72, at 20 (noting that on average, the City of Los Angeles’s neighborhood councils repre-
sent some 38,000 residents).  
 75. Jeffrey M. Berry et al., The Rebirth of Urban Democracy 49 (1993) 
(finding that successful neighborhood councils encompassed smaller geographic regions, 
with representative populations between 2,000 and 16,000 people).  
 76. See Richard Briffault, Who Rules at Home?: One Person/One Vote and Local Gov-
ernments, 60 U. Chi. L. Rev. 339, 413–14 (1993).  
 77. See Salsich, supra note 70, at 717 (listing those who are eligible for voting mem-
bership in the City of Atlanta’s neighborhood councils); Musso et al., supra note 72, at 
26–27 (detailing the diverse definitions for community stakeholders among the City of 
Los Angeles’s neighborhood councils).  
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for commonly held values.78 Otherwise, the dialogic process among the 
homogenous or singularly focused will not lead to a sense of the true 
needs of the collective whole. In fact, the success of past attempts of civic 
engagement has been limited because many of the models, like Business 
Improvement Districts, have restricted membership and thus have had a 
more limited scope of public participation.79  
Another issue that arises with regard to neighborhood councils is 
whether they should be advisory or have decision-making authority.  
Most neighborhood councils are advisory, lacking decision-making  
authority80—largely due to the Voting Rights Act and legal liability con-
cerns.81 But if neighborhood councils do not have any formal decision-
making authority, will people even bother to get involved, or will they see 
the councils’ efforts as futile? One response is that neighborhood councils 
may not need de jure decision-making power in order to be effective. As 
long as they have de facto political power to affect local government deci-
sion-making, neighborhood councils will draw community stakeholders 
who will see that their efforts can inform and influence the  
decision-making process. Indeed, lobbyists and interest groups have no 
formal authority, but their influence on government decisions is well-
documented.82 Advisory neighborhood councils can have this type of in-
fluence, too. In fact, in some cities, local decision-makers have followed 
the recommendations of neighborhood councils up to eighty percent of 
the time.83  
Some neighborhood councils have been able to be this effective be-
cause their cities made them a formal part of the local decision-making 
process.84 For example, in Los Angeles, the city charter and attendant ena-
bling statutes provide neighborhood councils with the ability to hold 
public hearings before the City Council makes a decision on a matter, to 
monitor and give input on City service delivery, and to provide input on 
 
 
 78. See Parlow, supra note 1, at 169–70.  
 79. See Parlow, supra note 1, at 157–66 (detailing the failures of some past attempts 
at citizen participation and the limited successes of others, due to more narrow structures 
and memberships).  
 80. Id. at 173–75.  
 81. See generally Briffault, supra note 74, at 400–01 & n.240.  
 82. See Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and 
the Theory of Groups 141–48 (1965) and Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Competition 
Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence, 98 Q.J. Econ. 371, 371–72 (1983).  
 83. Patrick McGreevy, Appointed Charter Panel Weighs Reforms, L.A. Daily News, 
Feb. 12, 1998, at N6 (noting neighborhood council successes in New York City).  
 84. See, e.g., Benest, supra note 70 at A7–A9 (noting the City of Brea, California’s 
incorporation of neighborhood councils into the decision-making process); Briffault, supra 
note 74, at 1063 (noting that New York City has also incorporated neighborhood coun-
cils into its decision-making process).  
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the City budget each year.85 In this regard, these neighborhood councils 
consider proposed developments, government contracts, and other such 
decisions made by their respective local governments. This institutional 
legitimacy is critical; informal neighborhood groups in the past have had 
only limited success.86 
Overall, neighborhood councils can provide significant benefits to 
local politics and decision-making. They provide a forum for community 
stakeholders to come together and engage in a dialogic process where 
they can discern the public good. Neighborhood councils can take the 
results of that process and inform local decision-makers of community 
preferences and needs. This allows every community in a city, including 
those that are currently shut out of the local decision-making process, to 
influence local policy. This dialogic process, in theory, should lead to supe-
rior local government policies, laws, and decisions or, at the very least, 
those that are more representative than the captured local governments 
that many see today.  
Moreover, neighborhood councils can help minimize corruption in 
local government. By involving neighborhood councils in such matters as 
government contracting, budgeting, and land use decisions, cities ensure 
that the electorate keeps an informed eye on their elected officials and 
others serving in local government. Knowledge is power in these circum-
stances: Community stakeholders will know the issues involved in these 
matters and can blow the whistle if they perceive illegal actions taking 
place. Moreover, an engaged citizenry can also hold its elected officials 
accountable by voting them out of office when they engage in questiona-
ble behavior, as seen in the scandals in Detroit. While the increase in civic 
engagement may not eradicate corruption in local politics, such commu-
nity involvement should create more transparency and accountability in 
local government, which may lessen the incidence of corruption in cities. 
IV. Challenges for Increasing Minority Involvement 
There are no guarantees that neighborhood councils will be success-
ful in increasing minority involvement in local governance. For example, 
this model presumes that community stakeholders in minority communi-
ties will have the time and interest to engage in neighborhood councils. 
People are increasingly busy, and life is increasingly complex. Can people 
 
 
 85. See Charter of the City of Los Angeles vol I, art. IX, §§ 904, 907–10 
(2000).  
 86. Parlow, supra note 1, at 160–62. For an exciting example of a non-profit, 
community-based organization that inculcates many of the values of neighborhood coun-
cils discussed in this Essay, see The Center for Collaborative Change, 
http://newarkchange.org (last visited Oct. 26, 2010).  
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really find time for neighborhood councils if, for example, they are poor 
and work two jobs? 
Perhaps not, but community stakeholders may feel that finding the 
time is worth it if they see the benefits of their work, especially if their 
participation helps lead to more representative laws and policies. Indeed, 
some social scientists have noted that minorities participate in neighbor-
hood groups more often than they participate in other types of political 
organizations.87 Moreover, communities do not need one hundred percent 
community participation; that is not even practical. It is enough that the 
dialogic process is open to all and brings some members from across the 
community together to engage with one another.  
To accomplish this goal, however, cities will need to conduct signifi-
cant outreach efforts to establish and build neighborhood councils and to 
convince people that such involvement is worth their time. This is partic-
ularly so in minority communities, where there is distrust and skepticism 
of the willingness of local governments to include them.88 However, there 
have been instances of cities effectively reaching out to minority commu-
nities to incorporate them better into the local decision-making process.89 
For example, the city of Seattle, Washington, developed an outreach plan 
for minority communities to involve them in salvaging and improving the 
important (and redrafted) comprehensive plan for Seattle in 1994.90 The 
City planning office developed outreach toolkits that included ideas and 
resources to enable those working on the comprehensive plan to connect 
with stakeholders in minority communities who might not otherwise 
participate.91 Such efforts included translating materials into foreign lan-
guages for different communities.92 These focused efforts to broaden the 
local political coalition related to the comprehensive plan paid off: “Those 
interviewed indicated many episodes where previously marginalized 
groups, such as renters and racial minorities, were included relatively ef-
fectively in the deliberative process and had a clear impact on the 
outcome of plans within their neighborhoods.”93 
 
 
 87. See Kent E. Portney & Jeffrey M. Berry, Neighborhoods and Social Capital 24, 
available at http://ase.tufts.edu/polsci/faculty/portney/socialcap.pdf.  
 88. See David T. McTaggart, Reciprocity on the Streets: Reflections on the Fourth 
Amendment and the Duty to Cooperate with the Police, 76 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1233, 1234–35 
(2001).  
 89. See, e.g., Archon Fung, Empowered Participation: Reinventing Urban 
Democracy 173–97 (2004) (detailing Chicago’s training programs to involve a broader 
cross-section of the community in community policing and neighborhood beat meetings).  
 90. See Carmen Sirianni, Neighborhood Planning as Collaborative Democratic Design: 
The Case of Seattle, 73 J. Am. Plan. Ass’n 373 (2007).  
 91. Id. at 376.  
 92. Id.  
 93. Id. at 385.  
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In addition, neighborhood council success will depend on the will-
ingness of those with political power to share that power with minority 
communities. Elected officials, interest groups, and government adminis-
trators may resist sharing such power, but the inclusiveness and 
broadening of local political coalitions will be essential to the long-term 
success of these latest attempts at civic engagement. The expansion of po-
litical coalitions will be important in a city like Detroit, which has 
suffered from a culture of corruption perpetuated by a city government 
that largely excludes community stakeholders. Moreover, cities must be 
careful as to how they structure neighborhood councils and seek to en-
gage minorities in them. Studies have shown that small decision-making 
bodies tend to ignore or marginalize minority views unless there are pro-
cedural mechanisms to ensure minority support.94 Finally, neighborhood 
councils must also be properly funded. The Federal War on Poverty initia-
tives in the 1960s, which sought to include minority communities in the 
decision-making process, failed in part because of the lack of funding.95 
CONCLUSION 
There are many question marks for neighborhood councils, but they 
offer a potential solution (or at least a partial solution) to corruption in 
local politics by allowing citizens to keep their municipal governments 
transparent and accountable. Neighborhood councils also provide the po-
tential to improve civic engagement and empower the traditionally 
marginalized on the local level. Indeed, in cities where minority groups 
have made significant political gains, it has been the presence of accessible 
political institutions that allowed these disenfranchised groups to become 
part of the governing coalition.96 Neighborhood councils can provide that 
type of accessibility. They can also prove to be significant training grounds 
for minority leaders, who may then seek elected office at the local and 
higher levels of government. 
So far, the results are mixed on neighborhood councils’ success in 
expanding the participation base in local governance. One study in Los 
Angeles found that most neighborhood councils are still dominated by 
older, White, and more affluent residents and business owners.97 However, 
the study also notes that in traditionally disenfranchised sections of Los 
 
 
 94. See Kim, supra note 5, at 516–17.  
 95. See Salsich, supra note 70, at 713.  
 96. See, e.g., William Nelson, Black Mayoral Leadership, 2 Nat’l Pol. Sci. Rev. 188, 
192 (1990).  
 97. See, e.g., Juliet Musso et al., Representing Diversity in Community Governance: 
Neighborhood Councils in Los Angeles, Urban Initiative Pol’y Brief (Univ. S. Cal. Urban 
Initiative), June 2004, at 3, available at http://www.usc.edu/schools/sppd/research/ 
npp/nc_diversity.pdf.  
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Angeles (South Los Angeles and East Los Angeles), African Americans and 
Latinos, respectively, were represented in neighborhood councils at or 
above the proportion of their share of the regional population.98 Los  
Angeles’s neighborhood councils have also had successes in opposing the 
approval of liquor stores and other undesirable development projects;  
advocating for increased or targeted city services; and promoting youth-
related activities.99 These types of successes had traditionally eluded these 
disenfranchised communities before the advent of neighborhood councils.  
Neighborhood councils have had some success, but cities that create 
them must work, as described above, to ensure their continued success. 
Neighborhood councils can provide a potential avenue for local empow-
erment for poor and racial minority communities in a growing number 
of American cities, and they may also provide an institutional check 
against corruption in local government. This type of governmental reform 
may be one way to help fix America’s broken cities. 
 
 
 98. See, e.g., Musso et al., supra note 97, at 3.  
 99. See, e.g., Musso et al., supra note 72, at 51.  
